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Abstract 
Dynamic reform of public institutions: A model of motivated agents and 
collective reputation* 
 
State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals 
with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collec-
tive reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both 
high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector 
exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage 
path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a high-
reputation institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to 
a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivat-
ed workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out. 
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1 Introduction
There are three kinds of [nonmaterial] rewards: a sense of duty and purpose,
the status that derives from individual recognition and personal power, and
the associational benefits that come from being part of an organization
(or a small group within that organization) that is highly regarded by its
members or by society at large. ∼ James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (1989)
While most economists would agree that state capacity is an important factor for
economic performance, there is little consensus on how state capacity can be devel-
oped. Arguably, a key element of state capacity is a well-functioning public sector that
efficiently allocates resources to public goods and services, and limits distortionary fac-
tors such as corruption and elite capture that divert public funds away from socially
beneficial outlets. In turn, efficiency within the public sector is optimized when pub-
lic institutions are staffed by individuals with a motivation for public service, who
share the mission (objective) of the institution. This suggests that policies aimed at
selecting motivated workers into the public sector offer a promising way to reform
underperforming public institutions.
The issue of selection into the public sector, or other mission-oriented institutions,
has received significant attention in recent economic literature: The theoretical liter-
ature on public-sector motivation has highlighted the prediction that motivated indi-
viduals will disproportionately select into mission-oriented institutions (Francois, 2000
and Besley and Ghatak, 2005, see Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008 for an overview),
and empirical studies in Western Europe have confirmed that public-sector employees
exhibit higher relative levels of motivation and altruism than private-sector employ-
ees (Gregg et al., 2011 and Dur and Zoutenbier, 2014). However, recent research has
provided evidence of reverse sorting in some developing countries with public sectors
perceived to be of poor quality: Hanna and Wang (2013) and Banerjee et al. (2015) find
that prospective public-sector employees in India are more likely to engage in corrupt
behavior than their peers. Moreover, Cowley and Smith (2013) document that, after
controlling for demographic characteristics, public-sector workers report lower levels
of motivation than private-sector workers in twenty-one countries, and these countries
feature relatively high levels of corruption on average (see Finan et al., 2015 for an
overview of the empirical literature on selection into the public sector).
Given the predictions of the theoretical literature, these new empirical results
raise the question of why some public institutions appear to be in equilibria where
motivated individuals disproportionately select out of employment in the mission-
oriented sector. Additionally, given the role selection plays in providing state capacity,
an equally important question is how under-performing institutions can be reformed
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to bring about a transition to an equilibrium with efficient sorting.
In this paper, we show that the puzzle of multiple equilibria can be resolved by
considering a model of labor-market sorting with motivated agents who value both
mission and collective reputation. Additionally, we analyze a dynamic version of the
model and highlight the novel prediction that the effect of wages on motivation is
conditional on the reputation of the mission-oriented institution, which implies that
a non-monotonic wage path is needed to transition from a low-motivation to a high-
motivation steady-state.
The assumption that motivated employees value the collective reputation of their
employer is supported by the literature on identity and social image: As argued by
Akerlof and Kranton (2005), employees may directly value the identity associated
with their job, and will logically seek employment in institutions consistent with their
personal identity. Additionally, the collective reputation of an institution can affect
worker choice through the channel of prosocial signaling (a` la Be´nabou and Tirole,
2006, and Ariely et al., 2009) since the collective reputation, or aggregate behavior,
of an institution provides a signal of its employees’ type.1 Lastly, referring explicitly
to bureaucracies, the above quote from James Q. Wilson suggests that both mission
(purpose) and reputation matter to public-sector employees: while a motivated worker
might find a job in a well-regarded non-governmental organization attractive, they
might be negatively disposed towards working for a police force widely viewed as
corrupt.
To summarize, the model relies on two key assumptions: (i) there exists a moti-
vated type who, all else equal, has a higher productivity in mission-oriented institu-
tions; and (ii) the motivated type values the collective reputation of the institution,
deriving positive value from a high reputation and negative value from a low reputa-
tion.2 While we remain agnostic as to the precise mechanism behind this behavioral
element, the model we construct is consistent with a micro-foundation based on iden-
tity payoffs, prosocial signaling, or homophily.3
We first show that the model implies multiple equilibria – both low-motivation
1A related argument derives from social interaction in the workplace: given a correlation between the
collective reputation and workforce composition of an institution, value homophily in the workplace
(a` la Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954) provides yet another explanation why workers may value collective
reputation. Also, see Henderson and Steen (2015) for an in-depth discussion regarding the role of a
firm’s reputation in complementing the prosocial-identity of its employees.
2Following Tirole (1996), we define collective reputation as the average behavior within the institu-
tion. However, in our model, aggregate behavior is a linear function of the proportion of motivated
individuals, which allows us to define collective reputation as either aggregate behavior or aggregate
work-force composition.
3Non-motivated types may also value the collective reputation of the mission-oriented institution be-
cause of reputation concerns a` la Be´nabou and Tirole (2011); our analysis assumes that the motivated
type places a greater weight on the collective reputation than the non-motivated type or, equivalently,
that both types are characterized by some degree of homophily.
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equilibria and high-motivation (efficient) equilibria may exist for given parameter val-
ues. This multiplicity is intuitive, given that motivated types effectively value an
assortative labor-market match. Generally, a high-motivation equilibrium is charac-
terized by a higher proportion of motivated types and a lower institutional wage than
in the low-motivation equilibrium. The reason a lower wage is maintained in the
high-motivation equilibrium is that motivated types are compensated by the high-
motivation collective reputation (in addition to any mission payoffs), while the low
wage deters non-motivated types from entering the mission-oriented institution.4
Several articles have highlighted examples of multiple equilibria in models with
motivated agents (see for example Caselli and Morelli, 2004, Macchiavello, 2008, Kos-
feld and von Siemens, 2011, and Aldashev et al., 2014). The most novel contribution
of our paper is that we formally analyze the problem of reforming an institutional
culture. Specifically, we ask the question of how a mission-oriented institution with
low reputation and a relatively low proportion of motivated workers can transition to
an efficient, high-motivation steady-state equilibrium. The policy tool we consider for
enacting a transition is the relative wage; wages can be changed transparently and are
a commonly utilized policy tool for instituting public-sector reform (both in theory,
e.g. Besley and McLaren, 1993, and in practice, see Rose-Ackerman, 1999 pp. 71-75).
To analyze this question formally, we consider a dynamic version of the model
and demonstrate the novel prediction that the effect of a wage change on motivation
depends on the initial reputation of the mission oriented institution: starting from a
reputation of low-motivation, an increase in the wage increases aggregate motivation,
while starting from a reputation of high-motivation, an increase in the wage decreases
motivation. The intuition behind this result lies in the fact that, holding aggregate
motivation constant, a wage increase causes an equal proportion of non-motivated and
motivated workers to enter the mission-oriented institution. Therefore, if the mission-
oriented institution begins with a low average level of motivation, then the proportion
of motivated workers increases with a wage increase – leading to an increase in average
motivation and making the mission-oriented institution even more attractive to moti-
vated workers. By the same mechanism, however, if the mission-oriented institution
begins with a high average level of motivation, than a higher wage decreases average
motivation.
This result also provides an explanation for the contrasting empirical results re-
garding the effect of wages on motivation. Two recent randomized control trials
(RCTs) vary wages for mission-oriented institutions and measure the resulting ef-
fect on the motivation of applicants: Dal Bo´ et al. (2013) randomized wages for a
4Analogous to the efficiency wages in Handy and Katz, 1998, Besley and Ghatak, 2005, and Delfgaauw
and Dur, 2007.
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position as a community development agent for a program in Mexico and find that
higher wages have a positive impact on public sector motivation. However, Deserranno
(2015) randomized expected earnings for a position as a community health promoter
for a program in Uganda and finds that higher wages have a negative impact on proso-
cial motivation.
Notably, a key difference between the two RCT’s is the nature of the employers:
while the program in Mexico was directly administered by the Mexican government,
ranked 103rd out of 175 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency
International, 2014), the program in Uganda was administered by BRAC, which is
second on the Global Journal ’s rankings of the top 500 NGOs (2015). Therefore,
assuming that the Mexican public sector has a low reputation while BRAC has a high
reputation, the finding that higher wages crowd out motivation in Uganda, but crowd
in motivation in Mexico are consistent with the theoretical finding that the effect of
wages on motivation depends on the underlying reputation of the mission-oriented
institution.
The conditional effect of wages on motivation also imply that, in contrast to the
findings of previous papers, a high-motivation steady state equilibrium cannot be
achieved by simply setting a low wage. The low wage is a feature, rather than a
cause, of the high-motivation equilibrium. Instead, we show that a transitional wage
path generally involves an initial increase in the wage to attract more motivated in-
dividuals into the mission-oriented institution (crowding in motivation), followed by a
gradual decrease of the wage to make the institution less attractive to non-motivated
individuals (crowding out non-motivation).5
The intuition for a non-monotonic transitional wage path follows from the rela-
tionship between motivation, wages and reputation outlined above: Starting from a
point of low motivation, only an increase in the wage will increase average motivation.
Wage increases alone, however, cannot cause a transition to the efficient, low-wage
equilibrium – after the level of motivation reaches a threshold level, above which the
relationship between motivation and wages switches, the wage must be gradually de-
creased to effect a transition to the high-motivation, low-wage equilibrium.
We emphasize that the framework we analyze is not peculiar to the public sector
and NGOs: to the extent that motivated workers value the collective reputation of
generic institutions, the model pertains to any firm or institution that would find it
beneficial to attract motivated workers. For example, firms may seek to replicate the
recruiting advantages of, say, Google, whose reputation as a dynamic and attractive
employer stems at least in part from the high quality of its existing workforce; similarly,
5While decreasing the wages of tenured workers in the public sector may be politically infeasible,
an equivalent transition can be achieved by only lowering the wages offered to incoming cohorts of
workers.
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economics departments may seek to recruit PhD students who are motivated to join
academia rather than the private sector, and these academically-motivated students
may in turn value a reputation for academic placements.
Crucially, however, we show that a transition from a low reputation to a high
reputation is only generally feasible if motivated workers value the mission of the
relevant institution. That is, a tipping-point reputation can only be reached through
a wage increase if, given a neutral reputation, motivated workers prefer employment
in the institution in question over their outside option, as is the case when motivated
workers directly value the social output of a public institution (i.e. mission-contingent
payoffs a` la Besley and Ghatak, 2005). This finding suggests that transitions are not
feasible in generic institutions, and may require that a firm actively invest in, say,
corporate social responsibility,6 or that transitions are only possible for departments
at universities with an overall reputation for academic excellence.
We also consider several relevant extensions to the baseline model. First, we show
how access to commitment may enable even a generic firm to transition to a high-
motivation equilibrium, as long as workers are also optimistic about the future repu-
tation of the institution. We then consider the case of correlation between a worker’s
ability and their level of motivation, and show how this correlation can be leveraged
to achieve a transition. This case also provides insight into a commonly-attempted
strategy of creating “elite” divisions within an existing institution – for this strategy
to be successful, the institution must both recruit disproportionately from an ability
type with a high average level of motivation and offer a relatively high wage. Without
a high initial wage, the strategy of recruiting from a high-motivation ability type may
not be sufficient, since the overall low reputation of the institution creates an adverse
selection problem.
1.1 Literature
In the classic study cited at the beginning of this paper, Wilson remarks that, given
the lack of incentives...“what is surprising is that bureaucrats work at all” (1989).
More generally, it has been argued that non-monetary incentives in the workplace play
an important role in determining worker’s behavior (Dewatripont et al., 1999, Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000, Akerlof and Kranton, 2005, Prendergast, 2008, Huck et al., 2012,
and Fischer and Huddart, 2008). A subset of this literature considers motivation in
the workplace, and has largely focused on optimal contracting in the presence of a
motivated type, given that non-monetary incentives can be crowded out or distorted
6The management literature suggests that corporations engage in charitable activities for precisely this
purpose; see for example Bhattacharya et al. (2008) “Using Corporate Social Responsibility to Win
the War for Talent.”
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by traditional monetary incentive contracts (e.g. Murdock, 2002, Dixit, 2002, Sliwka
(2007) and Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; see Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008 and
Prendergast, 2008 for an overview).
Another strand of this literature, in which our paper arguably falls, is concerned
with the question of optimal contracting with endogenous worker sorting into the
mission-oriented sector, given the presence of different behavioral types. Several pa-
pers highlight that the efficiency wage in the mission-oriented sector should be low
relative to the private sector, as a low wage will disproportionately attract work-
ers with public sector motivation who are compensated by non-pecuniary benefits of
public-sector employment (Handy and Katz, 1998, Francois, 2000, and Besley and
Ghatak, 2005). This result has been extended to account for the fact that other facets
of the public sector may disproportionately attract individuals with harmful qualities,
such as laziness or antisocial motives (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008, Auriol and Brilon,
2014), or into positions where altruism is counter-productive (Prendergast, 2007). In
an article contemporary to this paper, Henderson and Steen (2015) consider a model
of motivated agents who signal their prosocial identity through the reputation of their
employer, where reputation is a function of the actions of the firm, and show how this
can cause firms to benefit from endogenously choosing a prosocial purpose (mission).
Our main contribution to this literature is that by considering motivated agents
who value the collective reputation of an institution, the question of optimal con-
tracting is transformed from a problem of static equilibrium selection to a problem of
dynamic transition, since collective reputation functions as a state variable. That is,
similar to Tirole (1996), the institution and its current workers are burdened with the
legacy of past behavior, which implies that the impact of incentives becomes sensitive
to the institution’s starting point: higher wages increase motivation in a low-motivation
institution, but decrease motivation in a high-motivation institution. Therefore, re-
forming, say, a culture of corruption requires a more complex approach than simply
replicating the incentives of a low-corruption institution.
Our paper is also related to a set of papers that analyze transitions between norms
(e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Besley et al., 2014, Bidner and Francois, 2013, and
Acemoglu and Jackson, 2015). For example, in a paper related to ours in spirit,
Acemoglu and Jackson (2014) detail how endogenously enforced laws can be changed
dynamically to transition between a steady-state of lawlessness to a steady-state of
law-abiding. They show that a sudden shift in laws away from the current norm of
behavior can be counter-productive, but that a series of incremental shifts can result
in a transition. Our paper also shows that the path of a reform matters – a transi-
tion cannot be enacted by skipping straight to the wage of the efficient equilibrium.
However, in contrast to the findings of Acemoglu and Jackson (2014), we find that
6
the policy tool we consider (wages) must take a non-monotonic path for the system to
transition to the optimal steady state.
Lastly, we argue that our results help reconcile the well-known policy prescription
of a high public-sector “efficiency wage” to deter corruption (Besley and McLaren
(1993)) with the concern that higher wages will crowd out intrinsic motivation (Besley
and Ghatak, 2005). Indeed both results have empirical support: higher public-sector
wages are weakly correlated with lower corruption (Treisman, 2000, Van Rijckeghem
and Weder, 2001, and Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003), and there is evidence for
a below-market “public-sector efficiency wage” (see Gregg et al., 2011) in developed
nations. The theoretical results of this paper help reconcile these empirical findings:
In contexts where public institutions have a good reputation, higher wages will simply
crowd out motivated workers. However, in contexts where public institutions have a
poor reputation, say, due to high levels of corruption, then wage increases help combat
corruption directly through the efficiency-wage argument, and indirectly by increasing
the average motivation of public-sector workers.
2 Static Model
In this section we introduce a simple model that illustrates the relevant results.
Institutions and Workers:
There are two institutions in the market, labeled A and B. The analysis focuses on
the collective reputation and workforce composition of institution A, which is mission-
oriented, while institution B is conceptualized as an outside option employment in a
competitive market that is available to all workers.
There is a continuum of workers of measure one with a compact index set I.
Workers are one of two types: Non-motivated or Motivated. Take mi = 1 if worker i
is motivated and mi = 0 if non-motivated. A proportion λ of workers are motivated.
Workers each have institution-specific abilities: yi for institution A and xi for institu-
tion B. For simplicity, we constrain yi = 1 for the main analysis (this assumption is
relaxed in Section 5.2), while xi is heterogenous and distributed according to a uniform
distribution with support [x, x]. That is, all agents have same inherent ability at the
mission-oriented institution, but vary in their outside option employment opportunity.
Additionally, xi is uncorrelated with worker motivation, although we also relax this
assumption in Section 5.2.
Take ai = 1 if worker i is employed in institution A, and ai = 0 if i is employed in
institution B.
Payoffs:
Institution A has a demand for labor of measure ν ≤ min{λ, (1−λ)}, and receives the
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following the profit, or net social output, from each individual it hires:
piAi = piyi + β1 (mi = 1)− wi
Where yi is the ability of worker i, β reflects the higher productivity of motivated
workers at institution A (we discuss the foundation for this modeling feature below),
and wi is the wage paid to worker i. Institution A does not observe pi
A
i directly, but
aggregate profit, piA =
∫
I
piAj ai, is publicly observable. Since all workers produce the
same revenue in expectation, we constrain the wage in institution A to be constant
across workers, wA.
We add one assumption regarding institution A’s profit function, relative to ν.
Take x′ that solves:
(1− λ)x
′ − x
x− x = ν. (1)
Assumption 1
The output institution A earns from each non-motivated worker, pi, is greater than
ν + x′.
This assumption ensures that, holding average worker motivation constant, institution
A always maximizes profit at a wage that insures full employment.
Definition 1 (Collective Reputation)
The collective reputation of institution A is equal to C =
∫
I
aimi/
∫
I
ai.
We define the collective reputation as the proportion of motivated types in institution
A rather than aggregate behavior within A; however, the two are equivalent here since
types perfectly correlate with behavior. Therefore, this definition is consistent with
reputation payoffs that depend on type-composition (social signaling and homophily)
or institutional behavior (identity). In other words, agents can infer the composition
of types within institution A by observing A’s aggregate profit (performance). Since
the the collective reputation of B is perfectly negatively correlated with C, we can
interpret C as A’s reputation relative to B’s (we do not explicitly consider payoffs
associated with the collective reputation of B).
Firm B receives following the profit from each individual it hires:
piBi = xi − wi
Where wi is the wage paid to worker i. The individual’s ability, xi, is perfectly observed
by the private firm and the private market is fully competitive. Therefore, we simply
set each worker’s outside option wage, wi, equal to xi.
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Non-motivated workers have a standard linear utility function over own income:
Un(wi) = wi
Where wi is i’s wage.
Motivated workers differ from non-motivated workers in three regards: (1) they
are more productive if matched with institution A, (2) they may value the mission of
firm A, and hence may receive a direct benefit of employment in firm A (as in Francois,
2000 and Besley and Ghatak, 2005), (3) they value the collective reputation (workforce
composition) of the mission-oriented sector A, e.g. due to type signaling or a direct
preference for workplace homogeneity. To reflect both (2) and (3), motivated workers
have a utility function of the following form:
Um(wi, C) = wi + v(C)ai
Where C is the proportion of motivated workers in institution A, and v(C) captures
motivated workers payoffs from both collective reputation and mission; v(·) is strictly
increasing and concave.
To be consistent with the intuition that motivated workers place a positive value on
a high reputation, and a negative value on a low reputation, we restrict the analysis to
v(1) > 0 and v(0) < 0. Additionally, the main analysis focuses on the case of v(λ) > 0.
Given a “generic” firm, it may be natural to assume that, holding constant wage and
reputation, a motivated agent perceives employment in firm B and employment in
firm A as equivalent (which translates into v(λ) = 0). However, the main focus of
the paper is on “mission-oriented” institutions, where motivated agents are directly
motivated by the mission, or product, of institution A (as in Besley and Ghatak 2005).
In our model, given the constant product produced by each worker in institution A,
mission-motivation simply translates into a constant benefit of working for institution
A. Therefore, holding constant reputation and wage between sectors, motivated work-
ers prefer working at the mission-oriented sector, which implies v(λ) > 0, where v(λ)
represents the mission-benefits a motivated worker receives from employment in the
mission-oriented institution.7
Since we are considering the wage of institution A as a policy tool, it is necessary
to specify the framework for employment in institution A when it is over-demanded
(i.e. demand for employment is greater than ν). Since all workers are ex-ante identical
from A’s perspective, workers are randomly selected for employment in institution A
from among the applicants.
7In Section 5.1, we characterize the case of a generic firm (v(λ) = 0) and show that mission-orientation
is a necessary condition for reform.
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Formally, workers choose aˆi ∈ {0, 1} at the beginning of the period, which deter-
mines employment according to the following rule:
ai
{
= 0 if aˆi = 0
= 1 w.p. q if aˆi = 1.
Where:
q = min
{
1,
ν∫
I
aˆi
}
.
Optimality and Equilibrium:
Throughout the paper, we consider the objective of maximizing the efficiency of the
mission-oriented sector, represented by social output, piA.8 Therefore, similar to the
optimal-contracting approach of Besley and Ghatak (2005), we define outcomes given
a wage in the mission-oriented institution, rather than analyzing wA as an equilibrium
choice.
Since information is complete, the equilibrium concept we use is Nash. That is, an
equilibrium is defined by a set of employment choices, {aˆi}, such that given wA and
C, non-motivated workers set aˆi = 1 iff w
A ≥ xi, non-motivated workers set aˆi = 1 iff
Um(w
A, C, ai = 1) ≥ xi, and C =
∫
I
aˆimi/
∫
I
aˆi.
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3 Analysis of the Static Model
In the analysis, we will use the terminology High/Low-Motivation to classify equilibria:
Definition 2 (Collective Reputation High/Low-Motivation)
The collective reputation of institution A is High-Motivation if C > λ and Low-
Motivation if C ≤ λ.
That is, the institution has a high-motivation reputation if a higher proportion of
motivated workers are employed in institution A, relative to the population average.
Additionally, we refer to an equilibrium with a high-motivation (low-motivation) rep-
utation as a high-motivation (low-motivation) equilibrium.
First, we characterize equilibria in the static model in terms of cutoff types xm for
motivated workers, and xn for non-motivated workers:
8However, note that given full employment in the mission-oriented sector, equilibria with greater piA
(higher C) also produce greater aggregate utility, since both output in the mission-oriented institution
and workers’ reputation-payoffs are higher.
9A more precise definition of equilibrium would include the set of employment outcomes, {ai}; however,
to allow for more efficient notation, we use the fact that with a continuum of workers, C can be defined
as a function of aˆi.
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Lemma 1 (Cutoff Equilibrium)
Given wA, equilibrium employment decisions are characterized by {xm, xn}, where
aˆi = 1 if and only if mi = 1 and xi ≤ xm or mi = 0 and xi ≤ xn.
Lemma 1 states that, in equilibrium, conditional on type, individuals with a relatively
low outside option will select into institution A. The result follows from single-crossing,
by motivation-type, of u(xi, ai = 1) and u(xi, ai = 0) in xi. (Formal proofs of all results
can be found in Appendix A.)
Lemma 1 also allows us to characterize equilibria by identifying the private-sector
abilities of individuals who are indifferent between the mission-oriented institution and
institution B, and the corresponding reputation. That is, an interior equilibrium is
defined by {xm, xn, C} that solve the following system of equations:
xm = w
A + v(C),
xn = w
A,
C =
λ(xm − x)
(1− λ)(xn − x) + λ(xm − x) .
Additionally, we define the function C(x,wA) as:
C(x,wA) =
λ(x− x)
(1− λ)(wA − x) + λ(x− x) ,
which allows us to define interior equilibria as {xm, xn, C(xm, wA)} such that xm =
w + v(C(xm, w
A)). Moreover, this allows us to define um(xi, C(xi, w
A), ai = 1), which
is the utility a motivated type, i, receives from employment in A if all motivated
workers with xj ≤ xi and all non-motivated workers with xj ≤ wA are employed in
A, and all others take their outside option. Since we define equilibria given wA, when
convenient we refer to C(x,wA) as a function of xm only (C(xm)). Note that an interior
equilibrium can be characterized as a cutoff ability, xi = xm, that satisfies:
um(xi, C(xi), ai = 1) = um(xi, C(xi), ai = 0).
Given these definitions, we show that a high-motivation equilibrium exists for all
w.
Lemma 2 (Existence high-motivation equilibrium)
Given wA ∈ (x, x), there exists a unique high-motivation equilibrium, {xm, xn, Ch},
with Ch > λ.
Existence follows from mission-motivation: since v(λ) > 0, this implies that, given
xn = w, either an interior crossing of um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) and um(xm, C(xm), ai = 0)
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Figure 1: These graphs illustrate the respective utility of employment in A (blue, solid
line) and the outside option (green, dashed line) for a motivated type with xi = xm,
given that all motivated workers with xi < xm set aˆi = 1. The left graph has w
A <
x− v(0), and the right graph has wA > x− v(0).
or a corner equilibrium with xm = x exists. (For the existence of high-motivation
equilibria when v(λ) ≤ 0, see Section 5.1.) Since both v(·) and C(xm) are concave,
um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) is concave in xm while um(xm, C(xm), ai = 0) is linear in xm,
which implies uniqueness.
Figure 1 illustrates equilibria for a given value of wA; the graph illustrates the
respective utility of employment in A and the outside option for a motivated type
with xi = xm, given that all motivated workers with xi < xm set aˆi = 1. Therefore,
given xn = w
A, C(xm) is increasing with xm. Again, interior equilibria are represented
by intersections of um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) and um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) since at an
intersection, motivated workers with xi = xm are indifferent between employment in
institution A and their outside option.
Proposition 1 (Condition for Unique Equilibrium/Multiple Equilibria)
If wA > x−v(0), then the high-motivation equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the
model. If wA ∈ (x, x− v(0)), then both high-motivation and low-motivation equilibria
exist.
A graphical proof of Proposition 1 follows from Figure 1: If wA > x − v(0), then
um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) is greater than um(xm, C(xm), ai = 0) at xm = x, and by the
concavity of um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) in xm, any intersection of um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1)
and um(xm, C(xm), ai = 0) occurs in the range (λ, x] (right graph). If w
A < x− v(0),
however, then um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) is smaller than um(xm, C(xm), ai = 0) at xm = x,
which implies that an intersection of um(xm, C(xm), ai = 1) and um(xm, C(xm), ai = 0)
occurs in the range (x, λ) (left graph).
While Proposition 1 characterizes the existence of high/low equilibria as a function
of the wage in institution A, it is of limited relevance when considering the optimal
equilibrium from the perspective of institution A. Instead, the existence of high and
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low-motivation market-clearing equilibria, where
∫
I
aˆi = ν, will be a relevant bench-
mark: by Assumption 1, given a fixed level of average motivation, a market-clearing
equilibrium is optimal from the perspective of the mission-oriented institution.
Proposition 2 (Market-Clearing Equilibria)
(i) A high-motivation, market-clearing equilibrium {wh, Ch′} exists.
(ii) If ν < (1− λ)(x− v(0)), then:
1. A low-motivation market-clearing equilibrium {wl, C l′} exists with wl > wh.
2. A low-motivation equilibrium exists for all w ∈ [x,wl] (including wh).
The existence of a high-motivation, market-clearing equilibrium follows from the
fact that the cutoff abilities in the unique high-motivation equilibrium, {xm, xn}h, are
both continuous functions of w, which implies that a crossing with
∫
I
aˆi = (1−λ)(xn−
x) + λ(xm − x) = ν exists. Proposition 2 also illustrates that both high and low-
motivation market-clearing equilibria exist when institution A’s demand for labor is
small relative to the overall labor market, and when the motivated type places a high
valuation on reputation (|v(0)| is high).
Additionally, given the existence of a low-motivation market-clearing equilibrium,
a low-motivation equilibrium exists for all wages in [x,wl]. This implies that, as long
as the high-motivation market-clearing is an interior equilibrium, it is not the unique
equilibrium for w = wh. Therefore, as we discuss in the next subsection, achieving the
optimal equilibrium is not always simply a matter of setting the optimal wage.
3.1 Optimal Contract
Next, we will partially characterize the optimal equilibrium from the point of view
of the mission-oriented institution. Note that even though a market-clearing wage is
optimal given a fixed level of average motivation (by Assumption 1), as the follow-
ing proposition illustrates, the equilibrium that maximizes piA(xm, xn, w
A) need not
coincide with a market-clearing equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Equilibrium)
The equilibrium that maximizes piA(xm, xn, w
A), {w∗, C∗}, is either equal to a market-
clearing, high-motivation equilibrium, {wh, Ch′}, or satisfies w∗ ≤ wh, C∗ ≥ Ch′ .
First, note that Proposition 3 implies that the optimal equilibrium must be a high-
motivation equilibrium. This follows from the fact that for any interior low-motivation
equilibrium, there exists an equivalent high-motivation equilibrium (with the same level
of
∫
I
aˆi) with higher net social output. Second, Proposition 3 states that {w∗, C∗} need
not correspond to a market-clearing equilibrium: since full employment is optimal for
A given a fixed level of reputation, w∗ < wh only if
∫
I
aˆ∗imi >
∫
I
aˆhimi. Formally, it
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is possible for w∗ < wA
h
since xm can be a decreasing function of w – therefore, an
equilibrium with a below-market wage may be optimal for A, since it may feature a
greater absolute number of motivated workers.
While Proposition 3 identifies the optimal equilibrium, the existence of multi-
ple equilibria implies that the model is indeterminate regarding the optimal contract.
Specifically, Proposition 2 shows that both high and low-motivation equilibria exist for
w∗ when |v(0)| is large, which implies that the mission-oriented institution cannot en-
sure optimality by simply setting wages equal to w∗. Moreover, Proposition 2 suggests
that institutions that simply set wages at market-clearing levels could find themselves
with either a low or high level of motivation, depending on the underlying beliefs of
agents as to which equilibrium the market will settle on (for a detailed discussion of
the indeterminacy of policy analysis in the presence of multiple equilibria, see Morris
and Shin, 2000).
It is also important to note that while Proposition 1 shows that the mission-oriented
institution can always solve the problem of equilibrium multiplicity by setting a suf-
ficiently high wage, such a solution is costly, since it requires a wage higher than
w∗. In fact, depending on parameter values, setting a wage high enough to ensure
the high-motivation equilibrium is unique may leave the mission-oriented institution
worse off then in the low-motivation market clearing equilibrium. Therefore, instead
of relying on criteria for equilibrium selection, we instead consider the problem of tran-
sitioning from a point of low-motivation to the optimal high-motivation equilibrium.
Arguably, characterizing such a transition is a first-order concern, since the persis-
tence of collective reputation (see Tirole, 1996) makes it unlikely that institutions
in a high-motivation equilibrium will suddenly shift to a low-motivation equilibrium.
However, the persistence of collective reputation, combined with legal and transac-
tional constraints that prevent institutions from immediately replacing their entire
workforce, also implies that moving from a low-motivation reputation to the optimal
high-motivation equilibrium is likely to require a transition. Therefore, in the next sec-
tion, we take a similar approach to Tirole (1996) and Acemoglu and Jackson (2014) and
introduce a dynamic version of the model that accounts for frictions stemming from
persistence in reputations, and that allows us to characterize a path for reforming a
mission-oriented institution with a culture of low-motivation.
4 Dynamic Model
We now add a dynamic layer to the static framework, and consider a discrete-time
dynamic framework with an infinite time horizon. We also introduce two plausible
sources of friction to the dynamic model. The first and most important source of
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friction is that motivated workers value the lagged collective reputation of institution
A. This captures the notion that reputations and reputation payoffs are sticky, as
perceptions might not update automatically (similar to Besley et al., 2014, as argued
Jean Tirole (1996) “...stereotypes are long-lasting because new members of a group
at least partially inherit the collective reputation of their elders”). Alternatively, this
assumption serves as an approximation of a continuous-time model, where only atom-
less groups of workers join institution A at any moment. Crucially, this friction implies
that transitions from low to high-reputation illustrated in this paper are not achieved
through the assumption of coordinated action of a mass of motivated workers.10
Formally, workers have period-utility payoffs analogous to the static framework,
with the exception that v(·) is a function of (Ct−1):
U tm(wi, C) = wi,t + v(Ct−1)ai,t
Therefore, motivated workers’ period payoffs are not a function of their expectations
regarding the proportion of motivated workers that will enter firm A’s workforce in
the current period. However, since expectations over future periods enter dynamic
payoffs, the equilibrium path of {Ct} is not independent of expectations.
The second source of friction we introduce is that workers have employment tenure
in institution A, in the sense that workers cannot be replaced by A directly. This
assumption is of secondary importance (we characterize results when this assumption is
non-binding), but increases the verisimilitude of the model to the underlying setting we
consider, since it is unlikely that institutions are able to fire and replace all workers in
a single period. Formally, this assumption introduces the possibility that employment
in institution A has an option value. We will clearly detail when and how results are
sensitive to this second feature of the dynamic model.
We also incorporate an exogenous method for replacement: a measure δ ∈ (0, 1] of
workers are “replaced” in each period, which we interpret as a natural rate of turnover
due to, for example, retirement. Workers have an equal probability of being replaced,
and are replaced by an individual of the same type and ability ({mi, xi}). Importantly,
replaced workers do not have employment tenure (ai,t−1 = 0 for replacement workers).
Therefore, δ both functions as a discount rate, and ensures a minimum level of worker
turnover in institution A (
∫
I
aiδ). Additionally, workers are always free to voluntarily
exit employment in the mission-oriented institution and take up employment in B.
Formally, as before, workers choose aˆi,t ∈ {0, 1} at the beginning of each period,
and employment is determined according to the following rule, which also incorporates
10Note that a simple repetition of the static game would produce the same equilibria as in the static
game. Alternatively, an overlapping-generations approach could be used to similar effect, as in Ace-
moglu and Jackson (2014) and Acemoglu and Jackson (2015).
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tenure:
ai,t

= 0 if aˆi,t = 0
= 1 if aˆi,t = 1, ai,t−1 = 1
= 1 w.p. q if aˆi,t = 1, ai,t−1 = 0
Where:
q = min
{
1,
δν +
∫
I
{aˆi,t = 0, ai,t−1 = 1}∫
I
{aˆi,t = 1, ai,t−1 = 0}
}
.
That is, if the mission-oriented institution is over-demanded, “open” slots in A (δν +∫
I
{aˆi,t = 0, ai,t−1 = 1}) are randomly allocated to new applicants (
∫
I
{aˆi,t = 1, ai,t−1 =
0}). Additionally, Ct = Ct−1 if employment in A is zero in time t.11
Institution A sets wages for all periods, {wAt }∞1 , at the beginning of period 1. The
assumption that A can fully commit to wages is extreme – however, we will show that
our results regarding a transition does not depend on this assumption. The timing of
the period game is as follows:
1. A sets {wAt }∞1 (period 1 only).
2. {wAt }∞1 , Ct−1 observed by workers.
3. Workers choose aˆi,t ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Period utility (ai,t) realizes.
5. δ workers replaced at random.
Dynamic payoffs:
Institution A has period payoffs that are equivalent to the static model, and dynamic
payoffs equal to:
ΠA =
∞∑
t=1
(1− τ)t−1piAt .
Where τ ∈ (0, 1). As above, institution B sets wages equal to xi.
For workers, the dynamic setting introduces the possibility of a positive option
value of employment in institution A. Therefore, workers’ relative utility of employ-
ment in A takes the following form:
U t(mi, xi, ai,t = 1) = ut(w
A
t , Ct−1,mi)− xi + (1− δ)Oti ,
where ut(w
A
t , Ct−1,mi) is the period t payoff, and O
t
i represents the option value of
employment in institution A:
Oti = (1− qt+1)
[
u(wAt+1, Ct,mi)− xi + (1− δ)Ot+1i
]
Note that the option value at t is non-zero only if qt+1 < 1; that is, there is
11This rules out transition paths where institution A ‘resets’ its collective reputation by choosing a
wage low enough such that employment is equal to zero.
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no positive option value of holding a job in the mission-oriented institution unless A
will be over-demanded in the following period. Therefore, Oti represents a sum of the
expected benefit of holding a job in A, relative to applying in the following period,
over a contiguous set of periods in which A is over-demanded.
Since we are concerned with the reform of an existing institution, we consider
the situation where A “inherits” a reputation and workforce; that is, institution A is
endowed with reputation C0, and a t = 0 workforce such that
∫
I
ai,0 = ν and ai,0 = 1
iff mi = 1, xi < x
m and ai,0 = 1 iff mi = 0, xi < x
n.
Equilibrium:
Since information is complete, the equilibrium concept we use is sub-game perfect
Nash Equilibrium. Additionally, we follow the selection-criterium of Gul et al. (1986)
and assume that agents do not condition their choices on the past actions of sets of
agents of measure zero, which insures that unilateral deviations by a single worker do
not affect the actions of the other workers. Given a set of wages {wAt }∞1 and an initial
reputation C0, an equilibrium constitutes a set of employment choices, {aˆi,t}∞1 , that
maximize each worker’s dynamic utility:
U t(wAt , {aˆi,t}, Ct−1,mi, xi, {wAt }, {qt}, {Ct}),
given the implied reputation, {Ct−1}∞1 , and demand for jobs at the mission-oriented
institution, {qt}∞1 .
Similar to the static section, we consider the objective of transitioning institu-
tion A to the steady-state equilibrium that maximizes net social output (we define
steady-state equilibria formally below). While this objective is not always equivalent
to maximizing the discounted stream of profits, as long as institution A has a discount
rate, τ , that is low enough, then a wage path that transitions to the steady-state that
maximizes social output will always be preferable to remaining in any other steady
state. We address optimal transitions after introducing our main result.
4.1 Analysis of Dynamic Model
Before addressing the issue of transition, we introduce some general results.
First, we characterize an individual’s decision rule, fixing {wAt }, {qt}, and {Ct}.
Each worker chooses aˆi,t = 1 if, and only if, the following expression holds:
ut(w
A
t , Ct−1,mi) + (1− δ)Oti ≥ xi. (2)
Note that the decision rule is independent of ai,t−1, since the employment preference
is independent of tenure.
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Again, given {wAt }, {qt}, {Ct}, define xmt and xnt to be the ability of, respectively,
the motivated and non-motivated types that are indifferent between working in insti-
tutions A and B. That is, xmt and x
n
t solve:
ut(w
A
t , Ct−1,mi) + (1− δ)Oti = xi.
The following lemma extends the result of Lemma 1 to the dynamic model:
Lemma 3 (Cutoff Equilibrium)
Given {wA}, equilibrium employment decisions are characterized by {xmt , xnt }, where
aˆi = 1 if and only if mi = 1 and xi ≤ xmt or mi = 0 and xi ≤ xnt .
Lemma 1 extends to the dynamic model since, by motivation-type, Oti is a monoton-
ically decreasing function of xi. Lemma 3 allows us to characterize an equilibrium in
terms of cutoff types xmt and x
n
t , analogous to the static case.
The main focus of our analysis is on the optimal steady-state equilibrium, where
steady-state equilibria are defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Steady-State Equilibria)
Given {wAt } such that wAt = w¯A for all t, an equilibrium {xmt , xnt , Ct}∞t is a steady-state
equilibrium if xmt = x¯
m, xnt = x¯
n, and Ct = C¯ for all t.
The relationship between static and dynamic equilibrium is clarified by the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 (Static Equilibrium ⇔ Steady-State Equilibrium)
For each static equilibrium, {wA, xm, xn, C}, there exists a corresponding steady-state
equilibrium, {w¯A, x¯m, x¯n, C¯}∞t , with w¯A = wA, x¯m = xm, x¯n = xn, and C¯ = C; and
for each steady-state equilibrium, there exists a corresponding static equilibrium.
Proposition 4 shows that when both high and low-reputation equilibria exist in
the static model, then corresponding high and low-reputation steady-state equilibria
exist in the dynamic model. Additionally, it gives the following corollary:
Corollary 1
The optimal stead-state equilibrium {w¯A∗, C¯∗}∞t , corresponds to the optimal static
equilibrium, {wA∗, C∗}.
In the following text, we use {wA∗, C∗} to refer to the optimal steady-state equilibrium.
The following section analyzes the possibility of a dynamic transition from a low-
reputation steady-state to {wA∗, C∗}, precipitated by a designer who sets wages in
institution A, {wAt }∞1 .
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4.2 Dynamic Transition
To formalize the problem of transition introduced at the end of Section 3, we address
the question of whether a wage path {wAt }∞1 exists that induces a transition in the
state variable, Ct, from C0 < λ to Ct = C
∗, where {wA∗, C∗} is the steady-state
equilibrium that maximizes piAt . While the analysis is general, we often refer to the case
where C0 corresponds to a low-reputation market-clearing steady-state (C¯0, w¯
A
0 ), since
this addresses the question of transition from a dynamic equilibrium corresponding
to a low-reputation static equilibrium to a dynamic equilibrium corresponding to the
optimal static equilibrium. In these cases, we refer to w¯A0 as the starting wage, and
our description of a wage path includes w¯A0 .
4.2.1 Example: the case of δ = 1
To facilitate the exposition of the dynamic results, we begin by characterizing tran-
sitional wage paths and establishing conditions for their existence given δ = 1. With
δ = 1 there is full replacement in each period, which implies that tenure is non-binding
and agents’ dynamic payoffs are equal to their period payoffs. This allows us to illus-
trate the main findings of the model in a relatively simple manner.
Since workers only live for a single period, there is no option value of employment
in institution A and workers simply choose aˆi,t to maximize period utility:
U t(Ct−1,mi, xi, wAt , {qt})
{
= xi if aˆi,t = 0
= qt(w
A
t +miv(Ct−1)) + (1− qt)xi if aˆi,t = 1,
where qt = min{1,
∫
I
aˆi,t/ν}. This implies the following lemma:
Lemma 4 (Uniqueness)
With δ = 1, given Ct−1 and wAt , there exists a unique period-equilibrium {xmt , xnt , Ct}.
Additionally, given an interior
∫
I
aˆi,t, A’s reputation in period t, Ct, is high-motivation
(low-motivated) if, and only if, v(Ct−1) > 0 (v(Ct−1) ≤ 0).
Given uniqueness, we can characterize the comparative statics of the model with
respect to wages.
Lemma 5 (Crowding out/in motivation)
If v(Ct−1) ≤ 0, then ∂Ct(wAt )/∂wAt ≥ 0.
If v(Ct−1) > 0, then ∂Ct(wAt )/∂w
A
t ≤ 0.
Lemma 5 states that the direction of the effect of current-period wages on reputation
depends only on whether the reputation payoff the motivated type receives from em-
ployment in institution A is positive or negative: if the reputation payoff is positive,
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then higher wages crowd out motivated types; if the reputation payoff is negative, then
higher wages crowd in motivated types.
The proof follows from the linearity of utility in the public sector wage. Intuitively,
since xm and xn are linear functions of wAt , a wage increase effectively adds a mass
of workers to institution A to who have an average motivation of λ, which moves A’s
reputation closer to λ. And since, by Lemma 4, Ct ≤ λ if and only if v(Ct−1) ≤ 0,
increasing wAt will increase Ct in this case, while the reverse is true for v(Ct−1) > 0.
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Lemma 5 also provides insight regarding potential transition paths between an ini-
tial steady-state with low reputation, {w¯A0 , C¯0}, and the optimal steady-state, {wA∗, C∗}:
Lemma 6 (Non-Monotonic Transition)
Given an initial reputation, C0, such that v(C0) < 0, no monotonic wage path exists
that transitions to {wA∗, C∗}.
Lemma 6 follows from the comparative statics outlined in Lemma 5, and shows that
given a low initial reputation, a transition cannot be achieved by a wage path that
simply decreases wAt to w
A∗.13 Therefore, if a transition path exists from an initial
low-motivation steady-state, it must be non-monotonic.
The next result shows that a wage path always exists that transitions between a
low-motivation and high-motivation reputation, and characterizes the non-monotonic
wage path that enables this transition.
Proposition 5 (Existence of Transition)
Given δ = 1, a wage path that transitions to {wA∗, C∗} exists for any C0.
We focus on the proof for the case where v(C0) < 0, which also demonstrates the
result for v(C0) ≥ 0. Additionally, we consider the case where the optimal steady-
state equilibrium, {wA∗, C∗}, corresponds to a unique market-clearing steady-state
equilibrium, {wAh , Ch′}. (Other cases are addressed in Appendix A.)
To illustrate the non-monotonic transition, we prove the result by construction.
Specifically, the following non-monotonic wage path transitions from v(C0) < 0 to
{wA∗, C∗}:
1. wA1 solves w
A
1 + v(C0) = x (w
A
1 is set high enough that aˆi,1 = 1 for all i).
2. wAt for t > 1 solves
∫
I
aˆi,t = ν (after period 1, w
A
t is set at the market-clearing
level).
12Simply put, Lemma 5 states that wage increases moves the current-period reputation closer to that
of the population average since the distance between xm and xn is fixed by v(Ct−1). Clearly this
will not always be true locally for all distributions of xi, however, the result holds more generally for
changes in the wage that are large enough.
13Note that v(C0) < 0 implies C0 < λ, but the reverse need not be true; a transition can be achieved
with a monotonic wage path with C0 < λ and v(C0) > 0 since, by Lemma 4, C1 will be greater than
λ.
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Figure 2: This graph illustrates a wage path that transitions from a high-corruption
to a low-corruption equilibrium. Note the initial increase in the wage in the mission-
oriented institution (wAt ; solid line), followed by a decrease and convergence to the
efficiency wage. Corruption ((1−Ct); dashed line), however, decreases monotonically.
To see why this wage path results in a transition, it is informative to solve for the
market-clearing wage and the corresponding Ct in each period. Initially, institution A is
endowed with low-motivation reputation, v(C0) < 0, and by Lemma 5, A’s reputation
can only be increased by increasing wages. Taken to the extreme, wA1 is set at a
high enough level such that all workers prefer employment in institution A, and A’s
reputation in period 1 will replicate the population average (C1 = λ).
In period 2, given v(C1 = λ) > 0, Lemma 5 states that C2 is weakly decreasing
in wages, and Lemma 4 implies that C2 > λ for
∫
I
aˆi,t = ν. Moreover, the wage that
solves
∫
I
aˆi,2 = ν is smaller than w
A
1 , since at w
A
2 = w
A
1 , all agents would set aˆi,2 = 1.
Together, this implies that wA2 < w
A
1 , C2 > C1.
In period 3, the market-clearing wage, wA3 is strictly lower than w
A
2 , since C2 > C1
makes employment in institution A relatively more attractive for motivated workers
(v(C2) > v(C1)). Furthermore, by Lemma 5, w
A
3 < w
A
2 implies that C3 > C2.
By the same logic as in period 3, in all future periods, the market-clearing wage
is decreasing and A’s reputation is increasing. Moreover, since the sequences {wAt }
and {Ct} are bounded and monotonic, {wAt , Ct} must converge as n→∞. Lastly, the
points of convergence must correspond to {wA∗, C∗}, since this is the unique market-
clearing, high-motivation steady-state.
The transition outlined above illustrates the general shape of the non-monotonic
path of wages (also illustrated visually in Figure 2). Starting from a point of low-
motivation, wA must be increased to induce motivated workers to join institution A,
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hence “purchasing” a higher reputation. Once a sufficiently high reputation has been
reached – with δ = 1 this occurs in a single period – the process is reversed and public-
sector wages are lowered, disproportionately driving non-motivated workers out of the
public sector.
Note that this is not the unique transition path, but it ensures full employment
during the transition. Other wage paths can converge to {wA∗, C∗} in finite time:
C2 can be set arbitrarily close to 1 by decreasing w
A
2 below the market-clearing level.
Therefore, there exists a wA
′
2 such that C2 = C
∗, and the high-reputation stable point
is reached in period 3. (We discuss optimal transitions below.)
4.2.2 General analysis: δ ∈ (0, 1)
The intuition from the example with δ = 1 carries over to the more general model. In
particular, the following proposition partially characterizes the existence of a transition
from a low-motivation point to the optimal steady-state equilibrium:
Proposition 6 (Existence of transition v(C0) < 0⇒ {wA∗, C∗})
If v(C0) < 0, then there exists {wAt }′ such that an equilibrium with wAt → wA∗ and
Ct → C∗ exists.
Proposition 6 shows that an equilibrium transition is always possible for a mission-
oriented institution – an equilibrium exists that transitions to {wA∗, C∗} that is anal-
ogous to the example given for δ = 1. Unlike the case with full replacement, however,
since δ < 1, a shift to Ct = λ cannot be achieved in a single period: given w
A high
enough that all workers set aˆi = 1, A’s reputation will increase slowly as only a measure
of δν tenured workers in A are replaced in each period. However, after Ct−1 reaches
a threshold level where v(Ct−1) > 0 (this level can always be reached through a wage
increase since Ct → λ and v(λ) > 0), then the transition to {wA∗, C∗} can be achieved
by a market-clearing wage path.14
However, this result merely illustrates that there exists a wage path and a corre-
sponding equilibrium that transitions – multiple equilibria may exist for any wage path.
Specifically, for the “market-clearing” wage path described above, the equilibrium is
unique over the initial periods since, given the high wage, all workers set aˆi = 1, but
for the set of periods in which the wage is decreasing, multiple equilibrium outcomes
are possible. The following result extends Proposition 6 to all equilibria:
Proposition 7 (v(λ) > 0: Transition in all Equilibria)
If v(C0) < 0, then there exists {wAt }′ such that in any equilibrium, wAt → wA∗ and
Ct = C
∗ +  or Ct → C∗ +  for some  ≥ 0.
14Note that this transition path does not rely on the assumption of commitment to a wage path:
analogous to the case of full replacement, along the whole path of transition workers’ employment
choices are consistent with the choice that maximizes their period utility.
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Proposition 7 shows that while multiple equilibria may exist for a transition wage
path, in all equilibria {wAt }′ leads to a transition to some C ′ ≥ C∗. The intuition can
be illustrated using the “market-clearing” wage-path illustrated above: while multiple
equilibria exist for the subset of {wAt }′ where the wage is decreasing, xnt remains unique,
which implies that other equilibria can only occur when xmt is greater than the market-
clearing level. This implies that in all equilibria, the proportion of motivated workers
in institution A is weakly greater than under the market-clearing equilibrium, which
gives the result that in all equilibria, Ct is weakly greater than the reputation in the
market-clearing equilibrium.
4.2.3 Optimal Transition Path
Many public and other mission-oriented institutions may face legal and budgetary
constraints that limit their ability to raise wages in any given period. Therefore, we
detail the transition path that minimizes the maximum wage bill of institution A.15 To
avoid an open-set problem, we assume that wages can only be increased in multiples
of a discrete unit, , where  is arbitrarily small:
Proposition 8 (Minimum Budget)
The following wage path minimizes the maximum budget required to transition from
any C0 such that v(Ct−1) ≤ 0 to {wA∗ , C∗}:
wAt =

x+ v(0) +  for t s.t. v(Ct−1) ≤ 0
wA
′
where wA
′
solves Ct = C
∗ for t′ = min{t|v(Ct−1) > 0}
wA
∗
for t > t′.
The proof of Proposition 8 can be demonstrated simply using the best-response
dynamics of the static model since, given a fixed wage, an equilibrium of the dynamic
model exists where the period-equilibrium converges to a stable equilibrium of the
static model. Moreover, the only static equilibria that are stable are either corner
solutions, or equilibria where Um(x
m, ai = 1) crosses Um(x
m, ai = 0) from above. This
implies that, given wAt = x + v(0), which ensures that x
m = x is not an equilibrium,
the unique stable static equilibrium is a high-motivation equilibrium, and the dynamic
model will converge to a high-motivation point. In other words, if the wage is set high
enough that the motivated worker with the lowest ability wishes to join the public
sector even when C = 0, then there is a unique stable equilibrium of the static model
at C ′ > λ. Therefore, regardless of C0, the dynamic model will converge to C ′, and t′
15The “utility-optimal” transition path is not well-defined, given that multiple equilibria exist for most
wage paths that result in a transition. Even disregarding multiplicity, a characterization of a transition
that maximizes A’s utility will be highly sensitive to the precise tradeoff between the speed of the
transition and its aggregate cost implied by the discount rate and other parameters.
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such that v(Ct′−1) > 0 will be reached in finite time.
Proposition 8 also shows that as soon as t′ such that v(Ct′−1) > 0 is reached, then a
transition to the efficient steady-state can be achieved in a single period by setting wAt′
low enough that institution A is under-demanded. This transition path implies that
institution A will not achieve a maximum profit in period t′. However, this may still
be a profitable strategy, since it achieves a faster transition to the efficient steady-state
equilibrium.16
Lastly, we point out that a transition can be achieved even if the mission-oriented
institution is legally constrained to keep the wage of past employees constant or non-
decreasing. As long as institution A can change wA for incoming cohorts, then the
wage paths described above will still result in a transition. In this case, however, a
transition can only be achieved through the natural rate of replacement, since non-
motivated workers cannot be actively pushed out of their jobs through lower wages.
5 Extensions
Here we discuss several relevant extensions.
5.1 Transition in Generic Firms (v(λ) = 0)
In this section, we show that v(λ) > 0 is not only a sufficient condition for a wage
path that transitions to {wA∗, C∗} in all equilibria, it is also a necessary condition.
Specifically, we consider the case of a “generic” firm without any mission-payoffs; i.e.
where motivated workers are indifferent between institutions A and B when wA = xi
and C = λ, which translates to v(λ) = 0. (Results are analogous for v(λ) < 0.)
First, we state the analogous result to Proposition 2:
Proposition 1’ (Existence of Multiple Equilibria’)
If v(λ) = 0, there exists a high-motivation equilibrium if ν if small enough and v(1)
large enough such that ν < λ(x+v(1)), and there exists a low-motivation equilibrium.
Similar to Proposition 2, Proposition 1’ shows that when v(λ) = 0, multiple equi-
libria exist when institution A’s demand for labor is relatively small compared to the
overall labor market, and when the motivated type places a high valuation on reputa-
tion (v(1) is high).
Moving on to the dynamic model,
16This strategy of transition may not be robust, since a large drop in salary may disturb the employer-
employee relationship by, for example, eroding trust (see Sliwka, 2007 and Ellingsen and Johannesson,
2008). Therefore, we have highlighted transition paths that involve market-clearing wages.
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Proposition 4’ (Non-Existence of Transition)
Given δ = 1, a wage path that transitions from v(C0) < 0 (C0 < λ) and {wA∗, C∗}
does not exist if v(λ) = 0.
The intuition for the nonexistence result for v(λ) = 0 follows from the same wage
path illustrated in Section 4.1.1. Note that C1 = λ can always be achieved by setting
a high wage in the first period. However, in the second period, an increase in the
proportion of motivated workers cannot be achieved through a wage decrease since
v(C1) = v(λ) = 0, and by Lemma 5, A’s reputation is weakly increasing in w
A.
Proposition 5 and Proposition 4’ demonstrate that the existence of a transition
path depends on whether a point such that v(Ct−1) > 0 can be reached through a
wage increase. If not, the region of C where the proportion of motivated workers
is increasing in wA cannot be reached, and a transitional wage path does not exist.
In a generic institution, v(Ct−1) > 0 only if Ct−1 > λ, which implies that a point
with v(Ct−1) > 0 cannot be reached through a wage increase. In a mission-oriented
institution, however, motivated workers strictly prefer working in the institution given
a neutral reputation. Therefore, v(Ct−1) > 0 can be achieved through a wage increase,
which enables a transition that is unavailable to generic firms.
In the general case of δ ∈ (0, 1), a weaker result than Proposition 4’ holds:
Proposition 5’ (Existence of transition to {wA∗, C∗})
If v(λ) = 0 and v(C0) < 0, then for any {wA} there exists an equilibrium such that
Ct ≤ λ for all t.
That is, in contrast to the case of full replacement, Proposition 5’ does not fully
rule out the possibility of a transition when v(λ) = 0 – under certain conditions, an
expectations-driven transition can be achieved.
To illustrate the possibility of a expectations-driven transition, take the following
example: Assume for simplicity that C0 = λ (the population average can always be
replicated through a wage increase) and that institution A commits to the following
wage path:
1. wA1 = w
A
2 market-clearing given C = λ, O
t
i = 0.
2. wAt market-clearing, given expections that
∫
I
aˆi = ν.
Now, suppose workers hold the belief that C1 > λ, and hence expect that insti-
tution A will be over-demanded in period 2. In this case, O1i (mi = 1, x
′
i) > O
1
i (mi =
0, x′i). This in turn implies that v(λ) +O
1
i (mi = 1) > O
1
i (mi = 0), and C1 > λ.
That is, given the expectation that C1 will be greater than λ, and that institution
A will be over-demanded in period 2, the option value of holding a job in A in period 1
is higher for motivated types than non-motivated types. This implies that motivated
workers will disproportionately enter into institution A in period 1, making the belief
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that C1 will be greater than λ self-fulfilling. After period 2, given that Ct is greater
than λ, the wage path detailed about will transition to a low-corruption equilibrium
by the same logic as the proof of Proposition 6.
Note that an expectations-driven transition requires both that workers hold “op-
timistic” beliefs regarding the future reputation of A, and that institution A is able to
commit to holding wages above a market-clearing level even after its reputation has
increased above λ. Absent commitment, A would prefer to set wages at a market-
clearing level in period 2; however, this would imply that O1i = 0, which would destroy
the incentive for motivated workers to disproportionately enter institution A in period
1. That is, in contrast to the case of a mission-oriented institution where a transition
does not depend on workers’ expectations, in a generic institution, absent commitment
to future wages, the expectations-driven transition would unravel.
5.2 Exploiting Correlation between Ability and Motivation
It is natural to imagine that an agent’s ability and their level of motivation may be
correlated. For example, due to either selection or socialization, it is often suggested
that individuals with a degree in economics are less prosocial and, depending on the
mission of their workplace, may therefore be less motivated. Here, we consider the
case where ability in institution A is heterogenous and correlated with motivation,
and show that this extension of the model suggests potentially important insights for
transitioning to a high-motivation steady state.
We amend the baseline model by introducing heterogeneity in worker ability within
institution A, yi. Specifically, yi ∈ {y1, ..., yp} and, for simplicity, we assume that
there is a measure 1/p of each ability-type with compact index set Ip. Additionally, a
proportion λp of each ability-type is motivated (abusing notation, we use a p superscript
to refer to variables that are differentiated by ability in institution A); take λ¯ to be the
average level of motivation of the population, λ¯ =
∑p λp/p. To introduce correlation
between ability and type, we assume that λi 6= λj for some i, j ∈ {1, ..., p}.
We also allow for a correlation between yi and xi: given yi = yp, ability in in-
stitution B is uniformly distributed over [xp, xp]. Again, to focus on the problem of
selecting based on motivation, ability (xi, yi) is observable and motivation is unobserv-
able. Analogous to the model above, institution A has a unit demand of νp < 1/p of
each ability-type, and sets a uniform wage conditional on yi, w
A,p.
Lastly, take Cpt to equal the average level of motivation by ability-level, and Ct
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equal to the average reputation of institution A:
Cpt =
∫
Ip
miai,t∫
Ip
ai,t
,
Ct =
∑p ∫
Ip
miai,t∫
I
ai,t
.
The following proposition illustrates that, depending on the precise nature of
reputation-payoffs, the correlation between ability and motivation can be exploited
to transition between a low-motivation point and the high-motivation steady state
equilibrium (the argument for existence of a high-motivation steady state equilibrium
is analogous to the baseline model).
Proposition 9 (Transition of Average Reputation)
(i) If motivated agents value ability-contingent reputation, i.e. Um,t(wi, C) = wi,t +
v(Cpt−1)ai,t, then a wage path that transitions from v(C0) < 0 to {wA∗, C∗} in all equi-
libria exists if, and only if, v(λp) > 0.
(ii) If motivated agents value the average reputation of the institution, i.e. Um,t(wi, C) =
wi,t + v(Ct−1)ai,t, then a wage path that transitions from v(C0) < 0 to {wA∗, C∗} in all
equilibria exists if v(λ¯) ≥ 0.
Result (i) is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 6: if motivated agents value
ability-contingent reputation, then each ability category can be treated as its own
institution. Result (ii), however, illustrates that if motivated agents value average rep-
utation, then institution A can exploit the correlation between ability and motivation
to transition to a high-motivation steady state even if v(λ¯) = 0. This result follows
from the simple intuition that A can manipulate its reputation by disproportionately
hiring agents from ability levels with average levels of motivation above that of the
population average (see Appendix A for the formal proof).
The insights from this section may inform a commonly-attempted strategy for re-
forming an institution by creating an “elite” division within the institution that is
staffed by highly-motivated individuals. Logically, this strategy may be successful
if recruitment for the elite division targets a group of individuals with a high av-
erage motivation, proxied by, say, a certain level educational achievement. However,
given a poor institutional reputation, the institution faces an adverse selection problem
that may cause this strategy may fail: among the target group, individuals with low
motivation are disproportionately attracted to the elite division, since the low collec-
tive reputation of the institution dissuades high-motivation individuals from applying.
Therefore, this strategy can only be successful if the elite division targets a group of
individuals with a high average motivation and sets a wage high enough to overcome
the adverse selection problem caused by the institution’s low collective reputation.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a model of labor-market sorting with motivated agents who
value both mission and collective reputation. We highlight the prediction that the
effect of wages on motivation is conditional upon the collective reputation of the
mission-oriented institution, which implies that a non-monotonic wage path is needed
to transition from a low-motivation to a high-motivation steady-state.
While many factors certainly contribute to the emergence of Weberian public bu-
reaucracies, it is informative to consider the path of public-sector wages during Swe-
den’s transition to a modern, well-functioning bureaucracy. Currently, Swedish bu-
reaucrats enjoy a reputation as belonging to one of the internationally best-regarded
systems of public administration and, in line with the predictions of a public-efficiency
wage, these results are achieved with a workforce that is paid seven to fourteen per-
cent less than peers in the private sector.17 However, in the mid-1800’s corruption was
endemic to the Swedish system public administration, where the system of payments
to government officials involved “gifts” for services rendered (see Rothstein, 2011). It
was only after a period of reform, involving a radical transformation of the system of
payment, that the Swedish bureaucracy evolved into the efficient institution we see
today. Interestingly, while public-sector wages were initially increased to ensure that
bureaucrats were not dependent on direct payments from citizens, and to open the
profession to a larger class of individuals, public-sector wages fell relative to private-
sector wages in “the decades surrounding the Second World War” (Granholm, 2013
pp. 101, translated from Swedish). Moreover, Sundell (2013) provides evidence that
nepotism in the Swedish bureaucracy decreased continually through this period, and
argues that this is indicative of a continuous transition to a well-functioning public
sector, a pattern that is consistent with the transition path we outline here.
We conclude with some comments on how the mechanism for transition we intro-
duce here can complement other efforts at reform, and with avenues for future research.
First, it is important to note that the non-pecuniary motives that we analyze depend
on the composition of types in the public institution, rather than the precise level
of corruption. That is, type-signaling and homophily are independent of the precise
behavior of non-motivated and motivated types, as long as there is a difference in
behavior between the two types that can be identified through the aggregate behavior
of the institution. Therefore, a direct anti-corruption measure, such as improved mon-
itoring, is orthogonal to our mechanism as long as workers update their expectations
of each type’s behavior.
Additionally, our mechanism is complementary to efforts to change institutional
17Controlling for observables, de Koning and de Hek, 2013 find an average differential of seven percent
amongst central government workers, and fourteen percent for local government.
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culture by changing institutional norms: If some proportion of workers are conformist
(see Bernheim, 1994 and Huck et al., 2012 for models of social norms based on con-
formity), and hence switch from non-motivated to motivated given some threshold
level of aggregate motivation, then increasing the proportion of motivated types in the
institution due to selection will precipitate a complementary shift in behavior of the
conformist types. This will in turn speed the transition by improving the institution’s
collective reputation.
Lastly, the model we present here is tailored to address the issue of reform in
the mission-oriented sector. However, institutional reputation is also important for
targeting talented and motivated individuals in the private sector (see Bhattacharya
et al., 2008). And while we address reform of generic institutions in Section 5.1 in
a partial-equilibrium setting, a relevant extension of our analysis would be to con-
sider reputation in a setting with endogenous mission and competition over motivated
workers.
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7 (For Online Publication) Appendix A: Proofs
7.1 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1:
First, for non-motivated types, Un(wi) = wi regardless of the place of employment.
Since wi(ai = 1) = w
A and wi(ai = 0) = xi, non-motivated workers have a best-
response to set aˆi = 1 iff xi < w
A.
Second, for motivated types, by contradiction, assume that there exists an equi-
librium with xj < xi and aˆj = 0, aˆi = 1. This implies that w
A + v(C) > xi and
wA + v(C) ≤ xj, a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
Since xn = wA, a high-motivation exists only if an equilibrium cutoff, xm, exists in the
range (wA, x].
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First, given wA ∈ (x, x), if x ≤ wA + v(C(x)) then a high-motivation equilibrium
with xn = wA and xm = x exists. Moreover, it is the unique high-motivation equilib-
rium since Um(x
m, C(xm), ai = 1) > Um(x
m, ai = 0) for x
m in [wA, x]. To see this, note
that at xm = wA, where C = λ, Um(x
m, C(λ), ai = 1) = w
A+v(λ) > Um(x
m, ai = 0) =
wA, and since v(C(xm)) is concave in xm, Um(x
m, C(xm), ai = 1) > Um(x
m, ai = 0)
over the whole interval [wA, x].
Second, if x > wA + v(C(x)) then there exists a crossing of UM(x
m, C(xm), ai = 1)
and Um(x
m, ai = 0) for some x
m ∈ (wA, x) by continuity, since U(xm = wA, C(λ), ai =
1) > Um(x
m = wA, ai = 0). As above, uniqueness follows from the concavity of
v(C(xm)) in xm. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) By Lemma 2, a high-motivation exists for all values of wA ∈ (x−v(1), x). Moreover,
in the high-motivation equilibrium,
∫
I
ai → 0 as wA+ → (x − v(1)) and
∫
I
ai → 1 as
wA− → x. Therefore, since both equilibrium cutoff values, xn and xm, are continuous
in wA, a high-motivation equilibrium with
∫
I
ai = ν exists from some value of w
A.
(ii.1) Given ν < (1 − λ)(x − v(0)), a market-clearing equilibrium exists where only
non-motivated individuals select into institution A: For any wA ∈ (x, x − v(0)), an
equilibrium exists where xm = x since wA+v(0) < x. Moreover, over wA ∈ (x, x−v(0)),∫
I
ai is increasing continuously from 0 to −(1 − λ)(x + v(0)) in this low-motivation
equilibrium, which implies a market-clearing equilibrium exists since ν < (1− λ)(x−
v(0)).
(ii.2) Follows from the proof of (ii.1). 
Proof of Proposition 3:
First, we show that the optimal equilibrium cannot be a low-motivation equilibrium.
By contradiction, assume that the optimal equilibrium, {wA∗, C∗}, is a low-motivation
equilibrium and take a∗ =
∫
I
aˆi for this equilibrium. By the proof of Proposition 2
(i), for any value of a∗ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a high-motivation equilibrium, {wA, Ch}
with
∫
I
ai = a
∗. Note that the gross social output is higher than {wA∗, C∗} in this
high-motivation equilibrium. Moreover, wA must be lower than w∗, due to the utility
that motivated types receive from the higher level of reputation. Therefore, each
interior low-motivation equilibrium is dominated by a high-motivation equilibrium,
which implies that a∗ cannot be interior. However, a∗ cannot equal 0 by Assumption
1 and cannot equal 1 since ν < 1, which implies that a∗ = 1 is dominated by the
market-clearing high-motivation equilibrium.
Second, to partially characterize the optimal equilibrium, we can utilize the com-
parative statics of C in the unique high-motivation equilibrium with respect to wA.
Note that result follows if ∂C(xm, xn)/∂wA ≤ 0, since the market-clearing high-
motivation equilibrium will have higher net social output than an equilibrium with
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a higher wage and lower average motivation.
Starting from wA
h
, consider a wage increase of ∆w to wA
′′
. Note that ∆xn = ∆w.
Assume, by contradiction, that in the unique high-motivation equilibrium at wA
′′
,
C(xm
′′
, xn
′′
) is equal to Ch
′
. This implies that ∆xm = ∆xn = ∆w, since the reputation-
payoffs are the same after the wage increase, and utility is linear with respect to wage.
However, if ∆xm = ∆xn, then C(xm
′′
, xn
′′
) < Ch
′
, since Ch
′
> λ. Therefore, at
xm
′′
= xm
′
+ ∆w, xm
′′
> wA
′′
+ v(C(xm
′′
, xn
′′
)), which implies that, given wA
′′
, the
corresponding high-motivation equilibrium has C ′′ < Ch
′
. This shows that at any
high-motivation equilibrium with wA > wA
h
, C < Ch
′
, which proves the result. 
7.2 Proofs for Section 4.1
Proof of Lemma 3:
To extend Lemma 1 to the dynamic case, it suffices to show that, by type, Oti , is mono-
tonically decreasing in xi, since this will preserve the single-crossing of U t(mi, xi, a
t
i =
1) and U t(mi, xi, a
t
i = 0). Note that for i, j of the same motivation-type with xj < xi,
the relative utility of employment in A is higher for j in each period, since the rela-
tive period utility is equal to ut(w
A
t , Ct−1,mi, ai = 1) − xi. Therefore, Oti is strictly
decreasing in xi, which implies the single-crossing condition. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof of Proposition 4 follows from an equivalence of the conditions for a steady-
state equilibrium and the equilibrium conditions for a static equilibrium, given the
constant collective reputation in the steady-state. Specifically, in a steady-state, the
option value of employment in A for the cutoff types is equal to zero: By contradiction,
assume Oti is strictly positive for xi = x¯
m, mi = 1. Since Ct, w
A are constant for
all t, Oti is strictly positive only if x¯
m < w¯A + v(C¯). However, this implies that
x¯m < w¯A + v(C¯) +Oti(x
m), which is a contradiction.
Given that the cutoff types are indifferent between aˆi = 0, 1 in each period,
{w¯A, x¯m, x¯n, C¯} define a steady-state equilibrium if and only if the following condi-
tions are satisfied:
x¯m = w¯A + v(C¯),
x¯n = w¯A,
C¯ =
λ(x¯m − x)
(1− λ)(x¯n − x) + λ(x¯m − x) ,
which are equivalent to the conditions for a static equilibrium. 
Proof of Corollary 1:
Since the period payoffs in a steady-state equilibrium are equivalent to the payoffs
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of the corresponding static equilibrium, ΠA =
∑
(1 − τ)t−1p¯iA is maximized at the
steady-state that maximizes p¯iA. 
Proof of Lemma 4:
The proof of uniqueness follows from the fact that workers maximize their objective
using the following simple decision rule:
aˆi,t = 1 iff w
A
t +miv(Ct−1) ≥ xi,
which implies a unique value for both xm, xn. Additionally, this equation shows that
xm > xn = wA iff v(Ct−1) > 0, which implies the second result. 
Proof of Lemma 5:
First, we give an expression for Ct as a function of the cutoff types:
Ct =
∫
I
aˆi,tmi∫
I
aˆi,t
=
λ(xmt − x)
(1− λ)(xnt − x) + λ(xmt − x)
Due to the quasi-linearity of both type’s utility with respect to the wage, for interior
values ∂xmt (w
A
t , Ct−1)/∂w
A
t = ∂x
n
t (w
A
t )/∂w
A
t = 1, which implies that:
∂Ct/∂wAt =
λ((1− λ)(xnt (wAt )− x) + λ(xmt (wAt , Ct−1)− x))− λ(xmt (wAt )− x)
((1− λ)(xnt (wAt )− x) + λ(xmt (wAt , Ct−1)− x))2
This expression if negative iff:
(1− λ)xnt (wAt ) + λxmt (wAt , Ct−1) < xmt (wAt ),
which is true iff xmt (w
A
t , Ct−1) > x
n
t (w
A
t ).
Next, note that the relationship between xmt (w
A
t , Ct−1) and x
n
t (w
A
t ) depends only
on the sign of v(Ct−1), since motivated types’ utility is separable with regard to the
wage and reputation. In particular:
xmt (w
A
t , Ct−1) Q xnt (wAt , Ct−1) iff v(Ct−1) Q 0.
Lastly, note that the same relationship holds when one of the two cutoffs is non-
interior, and when both are non-interior, ∂Ct/∂wAt = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 6:
The statement of Lemma 6 is equivalent to:
1. For {wAt } s.t. wAt+1 ≤ wAt , Ct < C∗ for all t.
2. For {wAt } s.t. wAt+1 ≥ wAt , Ct < C∗ for all t.
(1) follows directly from Lemma 5: given v(C0) < 0, ∂Ct(w
A
t )/∂w
A
t ≤ 0, which
implies Ct ≤ C0 for all for all t.
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(2) By contradiction, assume there exists {wAt } such that wAt+1 ≥ wAt , and Ct ≥ C∗
for some t. Take t equal to mint{t|Ct ≥ C∗}. It follows that Ct−1 < C∗, and therefore
∂Ct(w
A
t )/∂w
A
t > 0. By Lemma 5, this implies that v(Ct−1) ≤ 0. However, by Lemma
4, v(Ct−1) ≤ 0 implies that Ct ≤ λ, a contradiction since λ < C∗. 
Proof of Proposition 5:
Given {wA∗ , C∗} = {wAh , Ch′} and {wAh , Ch′} unique, existence of a transition given
v(λ) > 0 follows from the example provided in the main text.
If this is not the case, then the following wage path transitions to {wA∗ , C∗}:
1. wA1 solves w
A
1 + v(C0) = x; that is, w
A
1 is set high enough that aˆi,1 = 1 for all i.
2. wA2 solves C2 = C
∗.
3. wAt for t > 2 equals w
A∗ .
Note that there exists wA2 such that C2 = C
∗, since given v(C1 = λ) > 0, C2(wA2 ) is a
continuous function with a range of [λ, 1]. 
In the following proofs, for purposes of exposition it will occasionally be
useful for us to explicitly refer to expectation over wages, reputation and
demand for jobs in institution A, which we denote {w˜At }, {C˜t} and {q˜t}.
Proof of Proposition 6:
We show the result by construction. Take {wAt } such that:
1. wAt + v(C0) = x for t < t
′, where t′ = min{t|v(Ct′−1) > 0}.
2. wA
′
where wA
′
solves Ct = C
∗ given q˜t′+1 = 1 for t = t′.
3. wA
∗
for t > t′.
To show that (1) leads to Ct′−1 such that v(Ct′−1) > 0, note that aˆi,1 = 1 for
all workers independent of expectations of qt. Therefore, given w
A
t = x − v(C0) and∫
I
ai,tmi/
∫
I
ai,t < λ, Ct is strictly increasing since a measure δν of workers will join
institution A from the set of workers with ai,t = 0, who have an average motivation
greater than λ. This implies that, given wAt = x− v(C0), the sequence {Ct} converges
to λ as t → ∞, and {Ct} is unique (independent of expectations). This shows that,
since v(λ) > 0, there exists t′ such that v(Ct′−1) > 0, and that t′ is unique.
Next we show that (2) gives an equilibrium that transitions to {wA∗, C∗}. Note
that the distance between xmt and x
n
t is fixed by v(Ct−1) when qt+1 = 1. This implies
that, given qt+1 = 1 and v(Ct−1) > 0, Ct is decreasing function of wAt with a range of
[λ, 1]. Therefore, at t′ there exists a wAt′ such that given qt′+1 = 1, Ct′ = C
∗. Lastly,
note that an equilibrium exists with q˜t′+1 = 1 since, at {wA∗, C∗},
∫
I
ai = ν. 
Proof of Proposition 7:
Here we show that, given the wage path detailed in the proof of Proposition 6, any
equilibrium transitions to some C∗ + , where  ≥ 0. Note that we have already
shown that {wAt , Ct−1}t
′−1
0 is unique. However, multiple equilibrium may exist for
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{wAt , Ct}∞t′ . Take the set of reputations in the transition equilibrium detailed above
to be {wA′′t , C ′′t−1}; we will show, by contradiction, that for any other equilibrium
{wA′′t , Ct−1}, C ′′t ≤ Ct, which proves the result.
Assume there exists an equilibrium {wA′′t , Ct−1} where C ′′t > Ct for some t ≥ t′.
First, note that {wA′′t , C ′′t−1} is unique given expectations that q˜t = 1: if qt = 1 in
all periods, then workers will simply select employment that maximizes their period
payoffs, which will result in an equilibrium of {wA′′t , C ′′t−1}∞t′ . Therefore, other equilibria
will only occur under expectations that q˜t < 1 for some set of periods. However, given
wA
′′
t , institution A will only be over-demanded, q˜t < 1, if C
′′
t−1 < Ct−1.
Take t equal to the minimum value of t where q˜t < 1, and t¯ equal to the minimum
value of t where C
′′
t > Ct. It must be the case that t¯ > t, since C
′′
t = Ct for t < t, and
since q˜t < 1 only if C
′′
t < Ct. Moreover, given C
′′
t < Ct, C
′′
t+1 < Ct+1 since x
m′′
t+1 < x
m
t+1
and xnt is unchanged since, given w
A′′
t is non-increasing, the option value of ai = 1
is zero for the non-motivated cutoff type. This in turn implies, by induction, that
C
′′
t < Ct for all t ≥ t. Therefore, given {wA′′t }, all equilibria correspond to a sequence
of {Ct−1} that are bounded below (weakly) by {C ′′t−1}, which contradicts the existence
of an equilibrium {wA′′t , Ct−1} where C ′′t > Ct. 
Proof of Proposition 8:
Given that the proof of Proposition 7 establishes transition once a point with v(Ct−1) >
0 is reached, it suffices to show that setting a wage of x + v(0) +  will cause a
transition to a point such that v(Ct−1) > 0 in all equilibria. Note that if wA = x +
v(0) + , then there is a unique static (steady-state) equilibrium, since Um(x
m, ai = 1)
cannot intersect Um(x
m, ai = 0) from below. Moreover, since it is unique, it is a high-
motivation equilibrium by Lemma 2, which implies that Um(x
m, ai = 1) > Um(x
m, ai =
0) over the domain [x, x+ v(0) + ].
Next, take {C ′t, xm′t , xn′t } to be the set of reputation and cutoff abilities that result
from myopic behavior, where agents choose aˆi to maximize their period payoffs given
wAt = x + v(0) +  and C0. Given the constant wage, x
n′
t is constant and equal to
x+v(0) + . However, given Ct < C
h
t where C
h
t is the unique steady-state equilibrium,
Um,t(C(x
m
t−1), ai = 1) > Um,t(C(x
m
t−1), ai = 0) for all t > 2, which implies that x
m′
t >
xm
′
t−1. Moreover, the same logic implies that x
m′
t converges to the cutoff value in the
unique, high-motivation static equilibrium. Therefore, given x+v(0)+, {C ′t} converges
to Cht , which implies that v(C
′
t−1) > 0 for some t.
We now show that, given wAt = x + v(0) + , all equilibrium sequences of {Ct}
are bounded below by {C ′t}. First, note that since wages are non-increasing, Oti = 0
for xnt , which implies that x
n
t = x
n′
t in all equilibria. We can then prove the result by
induction: C1 ≥ C ′1 since xm1 = xm′1 unless the unless A is over-demanded in period 2,
in which case xm1 ≥ xm′1 . Moreover, by the same argument, given Ct−1 ≥ C ′t−1, it must
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be true that Ct ≥ C ′t.
This proves that, given wAt = x + v(0) + , {Ct} is bounded below by {C ′t} in
equilibrium, which implies that for all equilibria, there exists t such that v(C ′t−1) > 0.

7.3 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 1’:
High-motivation: Given ν < λ(x + v(1)), a market-clearing equilibrium exists where
only motivated individuals select into institution A. For wA ∈ (x − v(1), x), xn = x
in all equilibria since wA < x. However, a high-motivation equilibrium exists with
xm = wA+v(1), where C = 1 since all non-motivated workers select into B. Moreover,
over wA ∈ (x − v(1), x), ∫
I
ai is increasing continuously from 0 to λ(x + v(1)) in this
high-motivation equilibrium, which implies a market-clearing equilibrium exists since
ν < λ(x+ v(1)).
Low-motivation: Note that if v(λ) = 0 then a crossing of Um(w
A, C(xm), ai = 1)
and Um(w
A, C(xm), ai = 0) exists at x
m = xn = wA for wA ∈ (x, x). Therefore, a
low-motivation market-clearing equilibrium exists at wA = x+ ν. 
Proof of Proposition 4’:
Non-existence given v(λ) = 0 follows as a corollary to the proof of Lemma 4. By con-
tradiction, assume v(λ) = 0, v(C0) < 0 and {wAt } such that a transition to {wA∗t , C∗}
is an equilibrium. Since v(C0) < 0, it follows that C1 < λ. Therefore, for a transition
to exist, it must be true that Ct ≤ λ and Ct+1 > λ for some t.
However, if Ct = λ, then Ct+1 = λ since x
m
t+1(w
A
t+1, Ct) = x
n
t+1(w
A
t+1) when v(Ct) =
0. If Ct < λ, then v(Ct) < 0 and by the proof of Lemma 4, Ct+1 < λ, which contradicts
Ct+1 > λ. 
Proof of Proposition 5’:
Note that for a transition to occur along {wA}, it must be true that Ct−1 ≤ λ and
Ct > λ for some t. Since v(Ct−1) ≤ 0, it follows that, since Ct > λ, Oti(mi =
1, x′i) > O
t
i(mi = 0, x
′
i); that is, holding private-sector ability constant, the option
value of public sector employment must be higher for a motivated worker than a non-
motivated worker in period t. Additionally, for the option value of the motivated
worker to be higher, it must be true that workers believe that the public sector will be
over-demanded for some set {t+1, ..., t+n} and Ct′ > λ for some t′ ∈ {t+1, ..., t+n}.
However, given {wA}, take the set of beliefs {{C˜t+1, ..., C˜t+n}} such that C˜t′ ≤ λ for
all t′ ∈ {t+ 1, ..., t+n}. With any beliefs in this set, Ot′i (mi = 1, x′i) < Ot′i (mi = 0, x′i),
implying that Ct′ ≤ λ for t′ ∈ {t + 1, ..., t + n}. Therefore, under these beliefs,
Oti(mi = 1, x
′
i) < O
t
i(mi = 0, x
′
i), implying that some beliefs {C˜t+1, ..., C˜t+n} in this set
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are “self-fulling,” in the sense that they constitute an equilibrium where Ct ≤ λ. This
shows that for any {wA} that admits a transition in equilibrium, there is an alternative
set of beliefs such that there is no transition. 
Proof of Proposition 9:
For (i) note that if motivated workers value the ability-contingent reputation, then the
model in this section reduces to the model presented in the general analysis – therefore
the result follows from Propositions 7 and 5’.
For (ii), a transition can be achieved with a wage path, {wA,pt }, where:
wA,pt
{
= 0 if λp ≤ λ¯
= xp + v(Ct−1) if λp > λ¯,
until t′ such that v(Ct′−1) > 0, and w
A,p
t is market-clearing for t ≥ t′. Note that,
in contrast to the main analysis with v(λ) = 0, t′ exists since an ability level exists
with λp > λ¯ by the assumption that λi 6= λj for some i, j ∈ {1, ..., p}, and since
Ct →
∑p′ λp/|p′| > λ¯ as t→∞, where p′ ≡ {p|λp > λ¯}. That is, a reputation greater
than λ¯ is enabled by the fact that institution can achieve a high-motivation reputation
by selectively raising wages in ability-level that have a higher proportion of motivated
types. Give v(Ct′−1) > 0, a transition to {wA∗, C∗} is achieved by the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 7. 
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